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ANALOGICAL INFERENCE IN HUME'S
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Dale lacquette
The whole earth, believe me, Philo, is cursed and polluted.
-Demea

David Hume, in his philosophical writings on religion, is often guarded and
ambiguous about his own religious beliefs. There is dispute over which if any
of the characters in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion speaks for Hume.'
To further complicate things, Hume' s published remarks about religion sometimes
directly contradict his recorded pronouncements in private conversations with
some of his contemporaries. 2
But whether Hume was a deist, fideist, atheist, or agnostic, it is generally
agreed that his empiricist philosophy of religion precludes the probability that
an intelligent designer or designers of the universe could have human-like moral
qualities. 3 Hume's God, if he exists, is demonstrably amoral, or at least amoral
with respect to the welfare and happiness of his human creations. It is in part
for this reason that Philo, the religious skeptic of the Dialogues, concludes that
an intelligent designer of the universe would not be worthy of worship, but that
the proper religious attitude is at most to be prepared to give a 'plain, philosophical
assent to the proposition' that the cause or causes of order in the universe probably
bear some remote analogy to human intelligence. 4
II

The cause of order in human inventions is the activity of an intelligent designer.
Cleanthes, described by Pamphilus in the narrative introduction to Hume's
dialogues as a thinker of 'accurate philosophical turn', appeals to the principle
that like effects have like causes in order to support a version of the argument
from design for the existence of God. The principle may be formulated schematically.
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 2 No.3

July 1985

All rights reserved.

287

288

Dale Jacquette
(PI) For any events x and y, if x is an effect produced by causes c] , ... 'Cn
(n ~ 1), and y is an effect produced by causes C'I,'" ,c' n' then if x is
similar to y, then c 1>'" 'Cn is probably proportionately similar to
C'l,···,C'n

o

If the order in man-made devices is like the order in nature, then by this principle
of analogical inference it follows that the order in the universe is also probably
caused by the activity of a more perfect intelligent designer. 5 Cleanthes says to
Philo and Demea:

Look round the world: Contemplate the whole and every part of it: You
will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an
infinite number of lesser machines ... The curious adapting of means to
ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds,
the productions of human contrivance; of human design, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other,
we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also
resemble, and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the
mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned
to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument
a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the
existence of a Deity and his similarity to human mind and intelligence. 6
But as Philo observes immediately thereafter, an analogical inference is weakened
by every disanalogy. He maintains: " ... wherever you depart, in the least, from
the similarity of the cases, you diminish proportionably the evidence; and may
at last bring it to a very weak analogy, which is confessedly liable to error and
uncertainty ."7 The remaining dialogues are concerned in large part with a consideration of dis analogies , and with the significance and limits of analogical inference
in the argument from design. Philo concludes that an important disanalogy
between man and the intelligent designer of the universe is that the latter probably
does not have moral psychological properties.
This result depends on empirical evidence about the seemingly needless suffering and injustice in the world. It is related to what has traditionally been called
the problem of evil. But in this particular application of the problem, Philo does
not attempt to demonstrate an incompatibility in the divine properties of omnipotence and perfect benevolence, but instead challenges the possibility of producing
a valid analogical inference to the effect that the omnipotent intelligent designer
of the universe could be perfectly benevolent, or, indeed, that the designer could
have any moral qualities at all.'
According to Philo, there are just four P9Ssibilities to be considered. The
intelligent designer or designers causally responsible for order in the universe
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may be (i) perfectly good; (ii) perfectly evil; (iii) both good and evil; (iv) neither
good nor evil. But (i) and (ii) are contradicted by what Philo calls the mixed
phenomena that there is both good and evil in the world. The third possibility
in (iii) is also discounted, though for a somewhat unsatisfactory reason. Philo
claims that if the intelligent designer or designers of the universe were both good
and evil, then there would be an 'unsteadiness' or lack of uniformity in the
natural or scientific laws by which the universe is governed, reflecting the battle
between good and evil forces. But since this is not observed, the proposition
that the intelligent designer or designers may be both good and evil is rejected.
The only alternative is (iv), which states that the intelligent designer or designers
are neither good nor evil but amoral. 9
Here it is important to see that Philo's rejection of (iii) is premature and
improperly motivated. Philo remarks: " .. .if we consider. .. the perfect uniformity
and agreement of the parts of the universe, we shall not discover in it any marks
of a combat of malevolent with a benevolent being."!O But why should Hume
or Philo assume that an opposition of good and evil moral natures in the intelligent
designer or designers of the universe would necessarily manifest itself in a
discordance of natural laws? Why should good and evil fight each other in the
first place? And if they do, why not in the souls of men, where something like
a conflict of good and evil is often experienced anyway? Philo might argue that
if God or a committee of gods were both good and evil, then he or they would
be unworthy of worship, and that only a perfectly benevolent intelligent designer
of the universe could be an appropriate object of prayer, love and trust, or
righteous fear. But this need not be because the designer is amoral. On the
contrary, the possibility presented in (iii) seems more clearly to correspond to
the expected result of the analogical inference involved in the argument from
design. If like effects have like causes, then the cause of order in the universe
alight to have a moral nature relevantly similar to the moral nature of the cause
of order in human inventions-a mixture of good and evil. Hume's or Philo's
attempt to refute the proposition is unsatisfactory, and reveals a surprising inconsistency in the application of the principles of analogical inference.
III

In addition to Cleanthes' principle that like effects have like causes, Philo
offers the following rule:
When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined
together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see
the existence of the other: And this I call an argument from experience. II
Later, in Part VI of the Dialogues, he adds:
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... there occurs to me another hypothesis, which must acquire an air of
probability from the method of reasoning so much insisted on by
Cleanthes. That like effects arise from like causes: This principle he
supposes the foundation of all religion. But there is another principle
of the same kind, no less certain, and derived from the same source of
experience; that where several known circumstances are observed to be
similar, the unknown will also be found similar. Thus, if we see the
limbs of a human body, we conclude, that it is also attended with a
human head, though hid from us. Thus, if we see, through a chink in
a wall, a small part of the sun, we conclude, that were the wall removed,
we should see the whole body. In short, this method of reasoning is so
obvious and familiar, that no scruple can ever be made with regard to
its solidity. 12

Cleanthes' analogical inference principle (PI) can now be supplemented by
Philo's analogical inference principle (P2).
(P2) For any events or objects x and y, and any properties P and Q, if
x is ordinarily observed to have property Q whenever it is observed to
have property P, then if x is similar to y and y is observed to have
property P, then probably y also has property Q.
The degree of probability that may attach to analogical inferences supported by
either (PI) or (P2) will be determined for the most part by the degree of similarity
or relevant similarity between objects or events x and y. As Philo maintains, an
analogical inference is only as strong as its weakest dis analogy . Hume in the
person of Cleanthes or Philo does not elaborate further on the nebulous concept
of similarity, which for present purposes may be regarded as undefined. (It is
undoubtedly the least satisfactory element in the two principles, but also in a
sense the most important.)
If (P2) is assumed, then the following arguments involving Philo's principle
can be advanced. They are presented together for the sake of comparison.
(A) 1. Most every other time we have seen a pair of human limbs, it
was accompanied by a human head.
2. Here, then, is a pair of human limbs.
3. Therefore, it is highly probable that these limbs are also accompanied by a human head.
(B) 1. Most every other time we have seen the work of an intelligent
designer, it was the work of a being who also had a moral nature.
2. Here, then (indicating ostensively the universe as a whole or

ANALOGICAL INFERENCE IN HUME

291

some well-ordered, machine-like natural part of it), is the work of
an intelligent designer.
3. Therefore, it is highly probable that the universe is also the work
of a being who has a moral nature.
Argument (A) is supposed to establish the probable existence of a human head
accompanying a pair of human limbs, which alone are seen when the head is
hidden from inspection. Argument (B) is offered with equal apparent justification
as establishing the probable existence of some kind of moral nature accompanying
any intelligence capable of causing order in the universe, where the psychological
properties of the intelligent designer or designers are similarly hidden from
inspection.
The causes of machine-like artifacts in empirical experience are always beings
that have both intelligence and moral attributes. From this, by an application of
Philo's analogical inference principle (P2), in agreement with Cleanthes' analogical inference principle (Pl), it may be concluded that the cause of order in the
universe if probably an intelligent being with some sort of moral nature. The
burden of proof accordingly lies with Hume to demonstrate that the moral nature
of man is part of the disanalogy with the intelligent designer or designers.
The problem of evil in Parts X and XI of the Dialogues may appear to provide
the required disanalogy, but in fact it is inconclusive. The data of natural evil
have no evidential priority over the data that intelligence capable of designing
machinery is always accompanied by a moral psychology, and is never totally
amoral. The problem of evil is alternatively resolved by admitting that although
the intelligent designer probably has a moral nature, the intelligent designer is
probably not both omnipotent and perfectly benevolent. The existence of evil
does not entail that the intelligent designer is probably amoral, but only that the
intelligent designer is probably not worthy of worship. But this could be true
even (and especially) if the designer has human-like moral qualities. The problem
of evil therefore cannot overturn the conclusion that the designer is probably
moral. The consistent application of Hume' s principles of analogical inference
suggest as a corollary to the argument from design that the intelligent designer
or designers of the universe would also probably have a moral psychology.
IV

Philo, Cleanthes, and Demea agree to critically examine the argument from
design, but only with the explicit understanding that the nature, not the existence,
of God is open to dispute. 13 Even here Hume is careful to cast Philo's skepticism
not as doubt about whether perfect benevolence is logically compatible with the
presumed omnipotence of the intelligent designer in light of natural evil, but

Dale Jacquette

292

instead as reluctance to concede that any moral properties of the designer can
be inferred from the empirical evidence by the principles of analogical inference
authorized in the argument from design. 14 Within these constraints, Hume attempts
to undermine Enlightenment confidence in the argument as a relevantly significant
foundation for religious practice and belief. 15
It is easy to see why Hume might want to conclude that the intelligent designer
is probably amoral rather than perfectly benevolent but not omnipotent, or partly
good and partly evil. The philosophical theist described by Philo in the final
sections of the dialogues is supposed to be dispassionate. 16 There is no particular
difficulty in remaining dispassionate with respect to an intelligent omnipotent
designer that has no human-like moral psychological qualities. But toward an
intelligent designer or committee of designers that is good and evil, or perfectly
benevolent but not omnipotent, the situation is very different. If the designer is
moral, he may stand in ethical judgment of man. The possibilities of moral
inter-relationships, duties, and obligations which then arise contradict Philo's
implied rationale for the dispassionate attitude. God or the committee of gods
might find the sins of man morally reprehensible, and punish or reward individuals
for their conduct. It would make sense to pray to God or the gods for forgiveness
or guidance in matters of ethical choice. The dispassionate attitude of the philosophical theist who merely nods assent to the proposition that there is probably
an intelligent designer of the universe would be unjustified.
Hume's philosophy of religion therefore depends essentially on the moral
dis analogy between human designers and the divine designer or designers. The
inference version of the problem of evil is supposed to show that man cannot
know whether God or the gods have any moral properties. But Philo's treatment
of the problem does not establish the required moral disanalogy between God
and man. The principles of analogical inference adduced by Cleanthes and Philo
uphold instead the contrary conclusion that if there is an intelligent designer of
the universe, then most probably the designer is not amoral, but has good, evil,
or some combination of good and evil human-like moral psychological qualities. 17
Franklin and Marshall College
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7. ibid., p. 144.
8. Ibid., pp. 142; 204-13.

9. Ibid., p. 212: "There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe:
that they are endowed with perfect goodness; that they have perfect malice; that they are opposite
and have both goodness and malice; that they have neither goodness nor malice. Mixed phenomena
can never prove the two former unmixed principles: and the uniformity and steadiness of general
laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable." Philo
maintains, ibid.: "The true conclusion is that the source of all things is entirely indifferent to all
these principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold, or to drought
above moisture, or to light above heavy ... What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to
moral with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer that the rectitude of the
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will be thought that we have still greater cause to exclude from him moral sentiments, such as we
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a person in motion, while some interpos'd object conceals the rest of his body. Here 'tis certain,
the imagination spreads out the whole figure. I give him a head and shoulders, and breast and neck.
These members I conceive and believe him to be possess'd of."
13. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 142.
14. Ibid., p. 211: "But let us still assert that, as this [supposed] goodness [of the Deity] is not
antecedently established but must be inferred from the phenomena, there can be no grounds for such
an inference while there are so many ills in the universe, and while these ills might so easily have
been remedied, as far as human understanding can be allowed to judge on such a subject. I am
skeptic enough to allow that the bad appearances, notwithstanding all my reasonings, may be
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15. Smith. pp. 52-54.
16. Gaskin, pp. 159-74.
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